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Ernest E. Figari, Jr.,*
Thomas A. Graves,** and A. Erin Dwyer***
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions, statutory enact-
ments, I and amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure2 and
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.3 This Article examines these devel-
opments and considers their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
With the failure of several federally insured savings and loan associations
in Texas4 and the appointment of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) as receiver for those associations, the FSLIC and the
courts of this state are engaged in a jurisdictional tug-of-war. The FSLIC
has argued, relying on federal enactments,' that when its appointment as a
receiver occurs, the Texas state courts are ousted of jurisdiction too hear
claims involving the failed association and, instead, the FSLIC has the exclu-
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•** B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. The enactments with procedural implications concern jurisdiction of the justice and
small claims courts and concurrent jurisdiction of the county court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 27.031(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1988) (justice court jurisdiction); Id. § 28.003.(b) (small
claims court jurisdiction); Id. § 26.042(a) (concurrent jurisdiction of county court with justice
courts); see infra text accompanying notes 19-21.
2. The Texas Supreme Court modified 93 rules, added 6 new rules, and repealed 15 rules
of civil procedure. These changes became effective January 1, 1988. See Order of the Supreme
Court of Texas Adopting and Amending Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 TEX. B.J. 850
(1987).
3. The Texas Supreme Court modified 18 rules and added 1 new rule of appellate proce-
dure. These changes became effective January 1, 1988. See Order of the Supreme Court of
Texas Adopting and Amending Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 50 TEX. B.J. 1044 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Glidden, Portrait of an Industry in Crisis, D. MAGAZINE, May 1987, at 94;
Area S&L Declared Insolvent, Dallas Morning News, May 21, 1987, at A 1, col. 2; Losses Leave
S&L Insolvent, Dallas Times Herald, Sept. 5, 1986, at Al, col. 3; The Fall of an Empire-
Auditors Untangle Web of Records to Find S&L Insolvent, Dallas; Times Herald, Mar. 25,
1984, at Kl, col. 1.
5. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982), which provides that "no court may... retrain
or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a receiver [Le., FSLIC]"; Id. § 1729(d), which
provides that "[iln connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the [FSLIC] shall
[be]... subject only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board."
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sive power to adjudicate those claims. 6 The FSLIC's opponents perceive it
as less than impartial in deciding claims involving such an association. Fur-
thermore, the adjudicatory power in the FSLIC would deprive those oppo-
nents of a jury trial. Thus, the FSLIC's opponents usually challenge the
FSLIC's jurisdiction.
During the survey period the Texas appellate courts thrice considered the
FSLIC's jurisdiction argument. In FSLIC v. Kennedy7 a Houston court of
appeals was confronted with a jurisdictional challenge by the FSLIC to a
judgment that a state court had entered against an insured association prior
to its failure. After the state trial court entered judgment and while the
court had plenary control over the suit, the institution failed and the FSLIC
took over its affairs as receiver. Subsequently, the FSLIC intervened in the
suit and, making its federal statutory argument, asserted that the state trial
court should set aside the judgment as the FSLIC now possessed the exclu-
sive power to review or adjudicate the dispute. Apparently unimpressed
with the attempted ouster of its jurisdiction, the state trial court refused to
set aside the judgment, holding that it was final for purposes of issue preclu-
sion and that the FSLIC did not have the power to review or relitigate the
matter.8 On appeal the FSLIC contended that it, not the state trial or appel-
late court, had the exclusive power to adjudicate the issues determined by
the judgment. Acknowledging the existence of federal authority supporting
the FSLIC's argument,9 the court of appeals found the federal enactments
inapplicable because the trial court had already adjudicated the claims in the
case before the institution failed.10
More significantly, in Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC1 the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) appointed the FSLIC receiver of
a failed association while claims against the association were still pending.
Enjoying more success with its federal statutory argument, the FSLIC per-
suaded the state trial court to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Dallas court of appeals disagreed and held the
federal enactments unconstitutional, stating that:
6. See Felt, FSLIC Receivership Claims Procedures, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
FAILING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 529 (1987) (setting forth Federal Home Loan Bank Board
procedures when FSLIC is receiver).
7. 732 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8. Undaunted by the state trial court's adverse determination, the FSLIC apparently
sought a more sympathetic forum by removing the suit to federal district court. This attempt
failed, however, and the federal district court remanded the suit back to the state trial court.
Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d at 3.
9. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1987) (FSLIC has exclu-
sive power to evaluate claims against institution) petition for cert. filed sub nom., Zohdi v.
FSLIC, No. 87-255 (filed Aug. 5, 1987); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269, 1269-70 (5th
Cir. 1986) (FSLIC may resolve facial merits of claims outside reorganization); North Miss.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1101-03 (5th Cir. 1985) (FSLIC as receiver
has power to administer all claims), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). But see Morrison-
Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1987) (courts retain
power to adjudicate claims, not FSLIC as receiver), petition for cert. filed, No. 87-451 (Sept.
17, 1987).
10. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d at 3.
11. 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ pending).
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Since FSLIC claims the authority to adjudicate those matters which
reside at the core of judicial power, and claims to have power to compel
parties to accept FSLIC adjudication, and claims to be able to oust any
court from any jurisdiction over FSLIC, our searching examination of
this statutory scheme compels us to hold that the jurisdiction claimed
by FSLIC . . . violates article III of the Constitution of the United
States. 12
Finally, in Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC 13 the Houston court of ap-
peals addressed and rejected the FSLIC's statutory argument. Framing the
question presented as "whether the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC), in its capacity as a receiver for an insolvent, insured state-
chartered savings and loan association, is susceptible to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Texas," 14 the court concluded "that
Congress has not given the FSLIC the exclusive power to adjudicate...
claims"'" involving such an association and, for that reason, "[t]he trial
court does have subject matter jurisdiction."' 6
Lamar Savings Association v. White 17 addressed the power of a trial court
in one Texas county to enjoin the prosecution of a competing action previ-
ously filed in another Texas county. The lender filed suit against the bor-
rower in Travis County seeking recovery on a promissory note. Within two
weeks, while the lender was still attempting to effect service on the borrower,
the borrower filed a competing action against the lender in Harris County.
All of the borrower's claims arose out of the parties' lending relationship.
The lender appeared in the later action and asserted a plea in abatement
based on its prior pending action. The trial court, however, overruled the
plea and allowed the suit before it to proceed forward. The same trial court
subsequently entered a temporary injunction against the lender prohibiting it
from, inter alia, maintaining a suit against the borrower in any other court
on the promissory note. The court of appeals directed that the temporary
injunction be dissolved and that the plea in abatement be granted, conclud-
ing that: "The court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties of the suit, to the exclusion of other coor-
dinate courts, (citations omitted) and no other court in which a subsequent
suit is filed has the power to interfere."' 8
12. Id. at 390.
13. No. C14-86-924-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 5, 1987, no writ) (not yet
reported); accord Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1219-20 (9th Cir.
1987) (FSLIC, as receiver, has no more power than as supervisor, a role that has no general
adjudicatory power), petition for cert. filed sub nor. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W.
3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
14. Summertree, No. C14-86-924-CV.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 731 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
18. 731 S.W.2d at 716. See generally Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974)
(general common law rule gives court in which suit first filed exclusive jurisdiction); Johnson v.
Avery, 414 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. 1966) (no other court in which a suit is subsequently filed may
interfere with the prior court). While the lender had not served the borrower in the earlier suit
at the time it filed the subsequent action, the court of appeals concluded that the lender had
1988]
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Finally, the Texas legislature recently increased the maximum amount in
controversy for county and justice courts. 19 The jurisdictional limit for both
courts is now $2,500.20 The small claims court, in counties with a popula-
tion in excess of 400,000, has concurrent jurisdiction with the justice court
for amounts up to $2,500.21
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute22 remains the subject of judicial
measurement. A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,23 indicates that a manufac-
turer may distribute a large quantity of its products into Texas without sub-
jecting itself to the personal jurisdiction of that state, provided each sale is
completed outside of Texas. Two individuals, both Louisiana residents,
purchased a Beech aircraft in Louisiana and, subsequently, were killed when
the plane crashed in Mississippi. Their survivors filed suit in Texas against
the manufacturer of the aircraft, a Delaware corporation having its principal
place of business in Kansas, and obtained service under the long-arm statute.
The aircraft manufacturer, which had neither registered to do business in
Texas nor had any facilities, bank accounts, real estate, or permanent em-
ployees there, moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The record showed that during the preceding five years Beech distributed
approximately $250 million of it's products to seventeen Texas dealers by
way of sales negotiated and completed in Kansas; that Beech sold some $72
million of its products to a Texas buyer, delivery F.O.B. Wichita, Kansas;
and that Beech purchased over $195 million of goods and services from over
500 Texas vendors pursuant to sales agreements negotiated in Kansas, with
delivery of all goods accepted there. While the suit clearly did not arise out
of the manufacturer's contacts with Texas, the trial court sustained personal
jurisdiction over Beech based on the volume and continuous stream of its
products flowing into the state. On appeal from this ruling, the Fifth Circuit
disagreed. Noting that "Beech exercised its right to structure its affairs in a
manner calculated to shield it from the general jurisdiction of ... Texas,
carefully requiring the negotiation, completion, and performance of all con-
tracts in Kansas", 24 the court concluded that "Beech has not afforded itself
the benefits and protections of the laws of Texas, but instead has calculatedly
avoided them."' 25 "[T]hat Beech products flow into Texas does not create a
general presence in that State", 26 concluded the court, as "[e]ach transaction
exercised utmost diligence in prosecuting the earlier suit, as the record showed that the lender
had attempted service on the borrower on four occasions. 731 S.W.2d at 717.
19. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 26.042(a), 27.031(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1988).
20. Id. §§ 26.042(a), 27.031(a).
21. Id. § 28.003(b).
22. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1988)
(formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985)).
23. 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
24. Id.




was completed outside of Texas.' 27
A nonresident may not avoid specific personal jurisdiction as easily as gen-
eral jurisdiction by remaining outside Texas. The Texas long-arm statute
authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident when the nonresi-
dent is doing business in Texas. 28 Doing business includes "commit[ing] a
tort in whole or in part in this state."' 29 Focusing on this aspect of the stat-
ute, a federal district court in Ramm v. Rowland 30 reiterated that the de-
fendant may not avoid jurisdiction merely by remaining physically outside
the forum state.31 The plaintiff, a Texas resident, filed suit against the de-
fendant, a New Jersey resident, for alienating the affections of his wife. Af-
ter the plaintiff's wife met the defendant on business in New York, the
defendant made several telephone calls to her in Texas and encouraged her
to meet him on various occasions outside the state, presumably to engage in
adulterous conduct. Observing that "[t]he Defendant's alleged acts of inten-
tionally contacting the Plaintiff's wife by phone to encourage her to leave
her husband is the very essence of the tort", 32 the court held that "[t]he
consequences of his acts created impact on the Plaintiff in Texas ' 33 and "the
totality of the circumstances ...satisfy the purposeful availment of the
Texas jurisdiction. '34
The Supreme Court of Texas concluded during an earlier survey period
that service under the Texas long-arm statute is not complete until the secre-
tary of state forwards process to the nonresident defendant. 35 In order to
establish the jurisdiction of the trial court over the nonresident's person, the
record must therefore affirmatively show that the process was forwarded. 36
The plaintiff may make this showing by filing a certificate of mailing issued
by the secretary of state.37
The nonresident defendant's time to appear after service might run from
(1) the date of service on the secretary of state, (2) the date the secretary of
state performs his statutory duty and mails process to the defendant, or
27. Id.
28. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (Vernon 1986).
29. Id. at 17.042(2).
30. 658 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
31. Id. at 708; see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (purposeful
availment of forum's rights establishes minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction); Shaffer v.
Heitner,, 433 U.S. 186, 212-16 (1977) (fairness, not mere presence of property in forum state,
establishes personal jurisdiction); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1266-67
(5th Cir. 1978) (foreseeable effects in forum state may provide minimum contacts), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Rockwell Int'l
Corp. v. KND Corp., 83 F.R.D. 556, 563-64 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (physical presence in forum not
dispositive).
32. Ramm, 658 F. Supp. at 708.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 709.
35. Whitney v. L&L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973); see Figari, Texas Civil
Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248, 248 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Annual
Survey].
36. Whitney, 500 S.W.2d at 96.
37. See Vanguard Invs. v. Fireplaceman, Inc., 641 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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(3) the date such process is received in the mail by the defendant. The court
of appeals in Bonewitz v. Bonewitz3 8 found that the earliest date controls.39
Using principles of agency, the court held "that service of process on the
Secretary of State constitutes constructive service on the nonresident defend-
ant, thereby triggering the nonresident defendant's answer date." °
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
The trial practitioner representing a nonresident defendant at a special
appearance hearing in state court should be aware of the implications of Zac
Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.,4 1 a recent decision of the Texas Supreme
Court. Reiterating that a nonresident defendant has the burden of proof at a
special appearance hearing,42 the court emphasized that this burden forces
the nonresident to adduce evidence negating all bases of personal jurisdic-
tion.43 Thus, in order to prevail at a special appearance hearing, the nonresi-
dent defendant must present evidence negating both a "specific" basis 44 and
a "general" basis45 for personal jurisdiction.46 This burden assumes addi-
tional significance in light of the prohibition against the use of affidavits at a
special appearance hearing.47 Thus, the nonresident defendant must satisfy
38. 726 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Id. at 230.
40. Id.
41. 734 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1987), cert. denied, - S. Ct. -, 98 L. Ed. 986 (1988).
42. Id. at 664; see, e.g., Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex.
1982) (defendant must negate all bases of personal jurisdiction); Hoppenfield v. Crook, 498
S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (burden of proof and persua-
sion on nonresident defendant); Taylor v. American Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26, 31
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ) (nonresident defendant bears burden of plead-
ing and proving lack of jurisdiction). But see Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629
F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1980) (if defendant challenges jurisdiction, plaintiff has burden of
proof), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d
483, 490 (5th Cir. 1974) (party invoking personal jurisdiction has burden of proof); Jetco Elec.
Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff must establish prima
facie showing that long-arm statute satisfied).
43. Zac Smith & Co., 734 S.W.2d at 664.
44. "Specific" personal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action relates to the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum and those contacts were occasioned by the defendant's pur-
poseful conduct. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980) (defendant must have clear notice that its acts may support personal jurisdiction);
Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (defendant subject to person
jurisdiction if it invokes benefits and protection of forum state's laws). Plaintiff cannot, by his
conduct alone, establish the requisite minimum contacts. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 298.
45. "General" personal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action does not relate to the
defendant's purposeful conduct within the forum, but the defendant's contacts with the forum
are continuous and systematic. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414-17 (1984) (general personal jurisdiction requires contacts of continuous and
systematic nature); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (due
process demands continuous and systematic contacts for general jurisdiction).
46. Zac Smith & Co., 734 S.W.2d at 664.
47. See Haskell v. Border City Bank, 649 S.W.2d 133, 134-35 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983,
no writ) (affidavits inadmissible as hearsay in special appearance hearing); Main Bank & Trust
v. Nye, 571 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affidavit
inadmissible hearsay unless and until Texas Legislature or supreme court decides otherwise).
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its burden through the testimony of live witnesses and other admissible
evidence.
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The recent amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have re-
laxed a number of the former service requirements. Rule 103 now allows the
trial court to authorize by order any person who is at least eighteen years of
age to serve process. 48 Moreover, the court may enter such an order without
a written motion and may not charge any fee for the issuance of such an
order.49 Additionally, sheriffs and constables are no longer limited to serv-
ing process in their county of office.50 Finally, when service is made by certi-
fied or registered mail, amended rule 106 has deleted the requirement that
delivery of the mailing be restricted to the addressee. 51
The trial practitioner must now use a new form of citation. Amended rule
9952 now details more specifically the contents of a citation, including a
mandatory admonition to the defendant being served that he has been sued
and must answer on the first Monday following twenty-one days after
service. 53
A number of decisions during the Survey period considered challenges to
service of process on the basis of inadvertent errors occurring in the course
of service. American Universal Insurance Co. v. D.B.&B, Inc.54 and
Pharmakinetics Laboratories, Inc. v. Katz" considered situations where the
clerk executed service by mail5 6 and a material variance existed between the
name of the defendant's agent as alleged in the petition and the name of the
person signing for and receiving process. In American Universal Insurance
Co. the petition stated that service could be effected by serving "Mr. Jack
Keith," the registered agent of the corporate defendant. Service was made
by certified mail. The return receipt, however showed that "J. Williams"
received and signed the receipt in the space labeled "agent". Observing that
nothing in the record showed "J. Williams" to be the agent of either the
48. TEX. R. Civ. P. 103. See generally Carlson, Procedural Changes Mandated by the
1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVOCATE 22, 23 (1987) (comprehensive outline of 1988 changes to
Texas civil procedure). Note, however, that a return of citation by a person so authorized
must be verified. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
49. TEX. R. Civ. P. 103.
50. Id.
51. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 106. Plaintiff need only mail process. Id.
52. Id. 99.
53. Id. The mandatory wording is:
You have been sued. You may employ an attorney. If you or your attorney do
not file a written answer with the clerk who issued this citation by 10:00 a.m. on
Monday next following the expiration of twenty days after you were served this
citation and petition, a default judgment may be taken against you.
Id. See generally Carlson, Procedural Changes Mandated by the 1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVO-
CATE 22, 24 (1987) (discussing new admonition in rule 99).
54. 725 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. 717 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
56. TEX. R. Civ. P. 103 (Vernon Supp. 1986), prior to its recent amendment, provided
that "[s]ervice by registered or certified mail may be made by the clerk of the court in which
the case is pending."
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registered agent or the corporate defendant, 57 the court of appeals invali-
dated the service and set aside the default judgment founded on such
service. 58
Similarly, in Pharmakinetics Laboratories, Inc. the petition requested ser-
vice on "Mr. Steve Woodman" as president of the corporate defendant.
When process was mailed to the defendant, however, "Charlotte Young"
signed the return receipt in the capacity of addressee. On the basis of such
service the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant. 59 Re-
iterating that when serving an agent for a corporation the record must show
that the individual served is in fact the agent for service, the court found the
variance to be fatally defective and set aside the default judgment.6°
Leach v. City National Bank 61 addressed the propriety of serving process
on an attorney who had been representing a defendant prior to suit. The
plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, a Georgia resident, seeking recovery
on a promissory note. After two unsuccessful attempts at personal service,
the plaintiff obtained an order from the trial court under rule 10662 allowing
substituted service on an attorney who had been representing the defendant
in negotiations before suit. Subsequently, on the basis of this service, the
plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant. Although he did
not contend that this method of service failed to provide him with actual
notice of the suit, the defendant appeared through counsel, questioned the
propriety of such service, and sought to set aside the default judgment. The
court of appeals, however, approved the method of service used finding that
it was reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice of suit.
63
The return receipt need not identify exactly what documents constituted
service. In Nelson v. Remmert the defendant claimed that the return was
deficient. 64 The plaintiff sought to obtain service over the defendant by certi-
fied mail. Rule 107,65 however, requires that the officer's return must also
contain the return receipt with the addressee's signature. 66 Focusing on this
requirement, the defendant sought to set aside a default judgment rendered
against him, arguing that the return was deficient because the receipt did not
reveal what instrument was mailed with it. The appellate court held that
57. American Universal, 725 S.W.2d at 765.
58. Id. at 767.
59. Pharmakinetics Labs., 717 S.W.2d at 706.
60. Id. at 706. See generally Keltner & Burke, Protecting the Record for Appeal: A Refer-
ence Guide in Texas Civil Cases, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 273, 302-03 (1986) (discussing record
requirements for default judgment).
61. 733 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
62. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(b). In addition to specifying certain methods of service upon a
defendant, the residual section of rule 106 provides that "the court may authorize servie ...
in any ... manner ... [which] will be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the
suit." Id. 106(b)(2).
63. Leach, 733 S.W.2d at 580; see also Butler v. Butler, 577 S.W.2d 501, 507 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1979, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (substitute service on defendant's attorney in di-
vorce proceeding upheld). See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 415, 419-20 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Annual Survey] (discussing Butler).
64. 726 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




rule 107 did not require the return receipt to identify what document, if any,
had been served.67 According to the court, to do so, might sometimes be a
practical impossibility. 6
V. PLEADINGS
The amendment of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 1369 provided the most
significant development in the area of pleadings. Aimed at deterring the fil-
ing of frivolous pleadings, 70 rule 13 now provides that the signatures of at-
torneys or parties on a court filing certify that they have read it and that, to
the best of their knowledge and belief reached after reasonable inquiry the
filing "is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought
for the purpose of harassment. '7 1 "Groundless," for purposes of the rule,
"[means] no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."' 72 Pursuant to
the rule, the trial court must presume that all filings are made in "good
faith."' 73 If a party or attorney signs a filing in violation of the rule, "the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose sanctions...
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both."'74 Notably, a
trial court may not impose sanctions except for "good cause" and, if im-
posed, the court must set forth the particulars of the good cause its sanctions
order. 75 The rule loses some effectiveness since it further provides that a
trial court may not impose sanctions if, before the earliest of either the 90th
day after the court determines a violation or prior to the expiration of the
trial court's plenary power, the offending party withdraws or amends the
filing to the satisfaction of the court.76
Two additional amendments to the rules of civil procedure in this area
67. Nelson, 726 S.W.2d at 173.
68. Id.
69. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
70. See generally, Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices (Including the Friv-
olous Suit Question), in ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 1988-RULES AND STATU TORY CHANGES F-2 to -12 (1987) (discussing legislative
history, purpose, and effect of new rule 13); Carlson, Procedural Changes Mandated by the
1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVOCATE 22, 23 (1987) (discussing frivolous suit deterrence purpose
of rule 13).
71. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (analogous federal rule regarding
signing of pleadings). See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1331-1335 (1969 & Supp. 1986) (discusses federal rule analogous to TEX. R.
Civ. P. 13).
72. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. Two filings are, however, exempt from the scope of the amended
rule 13. Specifically, the rule provides that neither a "general denial" nor "[t]he amount re-
quested for damages" in a pleading constitute a violation. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The trial court may impose sanctions against the offending party which include
disallowance of further discovery, assessment of discovery expenses or taxable costs, establish-
ment of designated facts, refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or
defenses, striking pleadings, dismissal of claims, rendition of a default judgment, and con-





bear note. Amended rule 45,77 apparently directed at reducing the bulkiness
of legal filings, now requires that all pleadings shall be on paper measuring
approximately 81/2 by 11 inches. Further, the legislature returned rule 7278
to its earlier wording79 and, as a result, now requires that a party serve a
court filing only on an "adverse party."80 Of course, court interpretations of
the term adverse party, as it appeared in the earlier version of the rule,
should provide guidance in determining who should be notified of or fur-
nished filings.8 .
During a prior Survey period, the supreme court, in a landmark decision,
ruled that prejudgment interest is recoverable in a personal injury case on
accrued actual damages.82 Benavides v. Isles Construction Co., 8 3 a recent
decision by the same court, emphasizes that its earlier decision did not dis-
pense with the pleading requirement for common law prejudgment inter-
est.84 Hence, if a personal injury plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest, he
must include a request for such a recovery in his pleadings.
Finally, Barrera v. ABank Brenham, N.A.85 illustrates one manner in
which a litigant's inaccurate pleading may haunt him. The plaintiff bank
brought suit to recover on the defendant's installment note. The bank incor-
porated an exhibit in its original petition stating that it had accelerated pay-
ment of the note on June 16, 1983. The defendant counterclaimed for
wrongful dishonor of a check, asserting that defendant had presented the
check to the bank for payment on June 7, 1983, when defendant still had
sufficient funds in his account to honor the check. The bank took the posi-
tion that by the time defendant presented the check, the bank had already
applied the account balance to the accelerated note. Accordingly, the bank
amended its original petition to correct the earlier error. In the amended
77. J 45(d); see Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices (Including the Frivo-
lous Suit Question), in ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 1988-RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-13 (1987) (concentrates on paper size
changes).
78. TEX. R. Civ. P. 72.
79. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 72 (Vernon 1979); Carlson, Procedural Changes Mandated by the
1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVOCATE 22, 23-24 (Oct. 1987) (rule 72 no longer requires delivery of
pleadings and motions).
80. TEX. R. Civ. P. 72; see Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices (Includ-
ing the Frivolous Suit Question), in ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE:
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988-RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-15 (1987).
81. See, e.g., Houston v. Sam P. Wallace & Co., 585 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. 1979) (notifi-
cation requirement of rule 72 applied to dismissal of a co-plaintiff); Barton v. Pacific Employ-
ers Indem. Co., 532 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(plaintiff filing motion for nonsuit must provide defendant with copy of motion); Three Bee
Inv. Corp. v. Galveston-Houston Co., 166 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942,
no writ) (defendant must provide all parties with pleas of privilege).
82. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Prejudgment Interest After Cavnar What Rate
Applies?, 50 TEX. B.J. 126 (1987) (discussing various rates of interest including the Cavnar
rule).
83. 726 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1987).
84. Id. at 25; accord Vidor Walgreen Pharmacy v. Fisher, 728 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1987).
The Benavides court recognized the general rule that a party need only plead for general relief
to recover statutory or contractual interest. 726 S.W.2d at 25.




pleading, the bank changed the date of acceleration, alleging that it had ac-
celerated the note on June 7, 1983 and that therefore the insufficiency of
funds in the defendant's account occurred on that date. Subsequently, the
bank secured a partial summary judgment on the counterclaim, and the de-
fendant appealed. Observing that the counterclaim for wrongful dishonor
depended upon whether the note was due in full at the time of the offset, the
court of appeals focused on the timing of the acceleration.8 6 The court noted
that superseded pleadings may contain ordinary admissions.8 7 The court
then held that defendant's response to the bank's motion for summary judg-
ment raised a material issue of fact since the motion raised the issue of the
discrepancy in acceleration dates.88 Thus, the bank's inconsistent pleading
provided evidence to the defendant sufficient to avoid a motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the Texas supreme court reversed because the defend-
ant failed to file the bank's inconsistent pleadings as summary judgment
proof.8 9
VI. VENUE
The recent and substantial amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure left the venue rules virtually unchanged.90 Apart from adopting minor
terminology changes to comport with the recently enacted Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code, the rule makers only amended the first sentence of
rule 88 to make clear that the pendency of a motion to transfer venue will
not abate or otherwise affect discovery. 91 This section goes on to discuss
judicial refinements to the existing venue rules.
It is well-established that a defendant waives his objection to improper
venue unless he files a written motion to transfer venue prior to or concur-
rently with any other plea, pleading or motion except a special appearance. 92
According to the court in Whitworth v. Kuhn,93 a defendant also waives his
venue rights, even if he timely files the required motion, unless he promptly
requests a hearing on the motion to transfer. 94
Rule 87 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the prompt deter-
mination of a motion to transfer venue and imposes a duty on the movant to
request a hearing on the motion.95 Although the defendant in Whitworth
timely filed his motion to transfer venue, he waited more than a year after
filing the motion before requesting a hearing. Concluding that the defend-
ant's complete lack of diligence was inconsistent with the purpose of rule
87(1), the court, in dicta, opined that the trial court could have refused to
86. Id. at 764.
87. Id. at 765. The court distinguished ordinary admissions from judicial admissions. Id.
88. Id.
89. MBank Brenham, N.A. v. Barrera, 721 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex. 1987).
90. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 87-89 with TEX. R. Civ. P. 87-89 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
91. TEX. R. Civ. P. 88.
92. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(1).
93. 734 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
94. Id. at 111.
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(1).
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consider the motion altogether. 96 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to ana-
lyze the merits of defendant's motion because the trial court had itself con-
sidered the motion notwithstanding defendant's failure to schedule a hearing
on the motion promptly. Since the plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to
bring the case within one of the permissive exceptions to venue,97 and the
defendant never specifically denied those facts,98 the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to transfer venue.99 The
defendant also complained that the trial court never signed a written order
denying his motion. The appellate court held that the statement of facts
reflecting the trial court's oral ruling from the bench was sufficient.l°°
The current venue rules permit only one venue determination. 101 Accord-
ingly, the court in Dorchester Master Limited Partnership v. Anthony 10 2 con-
ditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its
order purporting to transfer venue of a case because it was the court's second
venue order in the lawsuit. Shortly after the suit was commenced, the de-
fendants in Dorchester timely filed a motion to transfer venue that the trial
court denied by written order. More than two years later, the same defend-
ants filed another motion to transfer venue. Judge Anthony sua sponte va-
cated the first venue order and entered a second order transferring the case.
In holding that Judge Anthony's second order was void, the court of appeals
distinguished the decision in U.S. Resources v. Placke.10 3 There the court
held that a trial judge could reconsider his order transferring venue because
the court had not yet actually transferred the case. 104 In contrast, the trial
court in Dorchester had sustained venue in the county of suit more than two
years earlier, so the trial court's change of heart violated the express man-
date of rule 87(5).105 Finally, although Texas courts have held in the past
that the remedy of mandamus is rarely available to correct erroneous venue
96. 734 S.W.2d at 111. The court found it "implicit in the language and purpose of [rule
87(1)] that a movant may not sit on his rights indefinitely without incurring waiver." Id.
(citing 3 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 61.05[4] (1987) (timetable for motion
to transfer venue)).
97. Plaintiff alleged that venue was proper in the county of suit because the subject lease
agreement required defendant to make rental payments in that county. TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 15.035(a) (Vernon 1986) (venue provision for written contract).
98. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a) provides that "[a]ll venue facts, when properly pleaded, shall
be taken as true unless specifically denied by the adverse party."
99. Whitworth, 734 S.W.2d at 111.
100. Id. In making this determination, the court cited TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(2). Although
that rule does not state that oral pronouncements on the record are acceptable substitutes for
written orders, it does direct attorneys to use their best efforts to reduce all trial court rulings
to writing. The hapless defendant in Whitworth apparently never asked the trial court to sign
any order reflecting this venue determination.
101. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(5).
102. 734 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
103. 682 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ) (court may reconsider mo-
tion to transfer if no actual transfer has occurred); see also Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas
Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 491, 503 (1986) [hereinafter 1986
Annual Survey] (discussing Placke). The Dorchester court distinguished Placke, since no one
had taken any action based upon the Placke court's order. Dorchester, 734 S.W.2d at 152.
104. U.S. Resources, 682 S.W.2d at 405.
105. Dorchester, 734 S.W.2d at 152; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(5).
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decisions,' 0 6 the Dorchester court held that remedy was appropriate here be-
cause Judge Anthony's order was void."°7
VII. LIMITATIONS
Courts continued to wrestle with the constitutionality of the limitations
provisions in the Texas health care statutes during the Survey period. Five
years ago in Sax v. Votteler 10 8 the Texas Supreme Court declared former
article 5.82 of the Texas Insurance Code °9 unconstitutional as applied to a
minor's claim for medical malpractice. The court held that the statute vio-
lated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution' 10 because it abro-
gated a minor's cause of action once he reached the age of majority, if more
than two years had expired since the date of injury, even though the minor
had no right to bring his suit earlier due to his legal disability."'I Extending
the Sax analysis to another class of disabled litigants, the court in Tinkle v.
Henderson 112 held that article 5.82 was unconstitutional to the extent it
barred an action brought by a plaintiff who had remained continuously men-
tally incompetent from the time of injury until suit was filed.' 1 3 Unable to
distinguish between the situation of the child plaintiff in Sax and the argua-
bly incompetent plaintiff in Tinkle, 14 the court found that article 5.82 de-
prived the plaintiff of his cause of action before he had a reasonable
opportunity to discover the wrong and bring suit." 5
106. See Hendrick Medical Center v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
no writ) (mandamus improper after denial of motion to transfer venue), discussed in 1986
Annual Survey, supra note 103, at 502. The court in Hendrick held that issuing a writ of
mandamus would be tantamount to permitting an interlocutory appeal of the venue determina-
tion, which TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986) proscribes, and
that an adequate remedy at law was available to correct venue errors since a defendant could
appeal an erroneous venue ruling following judgment and reversal is automatic in such circum-
stances. 690 S.W.2d at 45-46. But see Ramcon Corp. v. American Steel Bldg. Co., 668 S.W.2d
459, 461 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (permitting mandamus remedy).
107. 734 S.W.2d at 152.
108. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983); see also Figari, Graves & Dwyer,, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law 34 Sw. L.J., 435-36 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Annual Survey]
(discusses Sax).
109. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 4, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865, repealed by Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064,
purported to establish an absolute two-year statute of limitations for filing malpractice suits
against physicians or hospitals carrying liability insurance. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988) essentially recodified the provisions of former article 5.82,
§ 4 of the Texas Insurance Code except that minors under age 12 have until their 14th birth-
day to file.
110. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
111. 648 S.W.2d at 667.
112. 730 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, writ ref'd).
113. Id. at 167.
114. While noting that the law accords children and incompetents comparable treatment,
the court observed that mental incompetents present a more compelling case for legal protec-
tion in many respects since "[t]hey are frequently less communicative, more vulnerable and
dependent than children." 730 S.W.2d at 166. See generally TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.001, .022 (Vernon 1986) (personal and property limitations provisions defining
and setting forth effect of disability, which includes unsound mind).
115. Tinkle, 730 S.W.2d at 166-67. The court also excused plaintiff's admitted failure to
comply with the notice requirements of article 5.82 due to his mental disability. Id. at 167.
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On broader grounds, the court in Tsai v. Wells 1 6 held that the limitations
provision contained in article 4590i, 17 the successor to former article 5.82 of
the insurance code, did not apply to bar plaintiff's cause of action that a
patient brought more than two years after a doctor's allegedly negligent
act."18 Although the plaintiff in Tsai was not legally disabled during the
limitations period, the court concluded sufficient evidence existed to support
the jury's finding in the case that the plaintiff did not have a reasonable
opportunity to discover the wrong until the date suit was commenced." 9
The court concluded that as a result, application of the absolute two-year
limitation to defeat plaintiff's action would violate the open courts provision
of the Texas Constitution. 120 Referring to recent Texas Supreme Court deci-
sions concerning article 4590i,121 the court opined that the open courts pro-
vision creates a "modified discovery rule."' 22 If, however, a claimant has a
reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong within the two-year limitation
period, then the limitation period is absolute and will not be tolled despite
the date the plaintiff discovers his injury. 23
Two cases during the Survey period discussed the ten-year statute of limi-
tations governing claims for injuries resulting from the defective design,
planning, construction, repair or inspection of improvements to real prop-
erty.124 One of the issues in Dubin v. Carrier Corp.125 was whether a wall
heater installed in an apartment was an "improvement" within the contem-
plation of the statute. The summary judgment evidence showed that the
heater was actually built into the apartment wall; that a flue extended
through the roof of the apartment; and that, if permanently removed, the
apartment would require some construction to cover the holes in the wall
space and the flue opening. Plaintiff, on the other hand, introduced evidence
116. 725 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
118. 725 S.W.2d at 273.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (provision that creates modified discovery rule).
121. See Neagle v. Nelson 685 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1985) (Texas Constitution gives citizens
reasonable chance to discovery injury) discussed in 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 103, at
503-04 (requirement to sue before knowing to do so absurd and unconstitutional); Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984); Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 419, 427-29 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Annual Survey].
122. 725 S.W.2d at 273. The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations will not
start running until the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving rise to his claimed damage or
until the date plaintiff should reasonably have discovered the facts. See Hays v. Hall, 488
S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972) (discovery rule prevents absurd and unjust results); Gaddis v.
Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1967) (discussing history of discovery rule). See gener-
ally, Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J.
284, 300-01 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Annual Survey] (discussing discovery rule for limitations).
123. 725 S.W.2d at 273.
124. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.008-.009 (Vernon 1986) repealed and
recodified former article 5536a of the revised civil statutes, Act of June 2, 1969, ch. 418, § 1,
1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 1379, 1379. Section 16.008 governs claims against licensed architects
and engineers for defective design, planning, and inspection of improvements to real property,
whereas section 16.009 applies to any person who constructs or repairs improvements to real
property. Id. Both statutes provide for a ten-year period of limitations, which commences to
run after the substantial completion of the improvements. Id.
125. 731 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
[Vol. 42
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
demonstrating that the heater could operate in a freestanding mode. Ob-
serving that the term improvement has been defined more broadly than "fix-
ture,"' 126 and includes everything that permanently enhances the value of the
premises, the court held that the heater was an improvement because it was
annexed to the soil. 27
Of perhaps greater significance was the court's holding that the statute
covered Carrier, one of the defendants, to begin with.128 Plaintiff argued
that Carrier was merely a supplier of the allegedly defective unit and, there-
fore, not entitled to the statute's protection, which is confined to persons
who construct or repair improvements to real property.' 29 Although the
court acknowledged that Carrier, at most, merely distributed a product that
was manufactured by another entity, it nevertheless held that Carrier en-
joyed the statute's benefits because it "functioned" as a manufacturer of the
improvement in the subject transaction. 30 Notwithstanding both of these
rulings in favor of the defendants, the court of appeals reversed the defend-
ants' summary judgment since they did not prove that the heater had been
installed more than ten years before the suits' commencement. 13'
The second case discussing the ten-year limitations period established the
elements of a prima facie defense. Suburban Homes v. Austin-Northwest
Development Co.' 32 holds that a party moving for summary judgment predi-
cated on section 16.009 need not establish the absence of fraudulent conceal-
ment that would otherwise toll commencement of the ten-year limitations
period. 133 Instead, the burden falls on the plaintiff to adduce proof support-
ing its allegation of fraudulent concealment once the defendant has estab-
lished prima facie the elements of the limitations defense.134 In addition, the
court held in Suburban Homes that a defendant engineer need not support
his motion for summary judgment with evidence that he is registered or li-
126. See Cantrell v. Broadnax, 306 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, no
writ) (improvements include all additions to freehold).
127. 731 S.W.2d at 653.
128. Id. at 655.
129. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009(a) (Vernon 1987) provides: "A claim-
ant must bring suit for damages ... against a person who constructs or repairs an improve-
ment to real property .... " Id.
130. Dubin, 731 S.W.2d at 655. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on McCulloch
v. Fox & Jacobs, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in
1986 Annual Survey, supra note 103, at 506, which it discussed at some length in its opinion.
In McCulloch the defendant contracted with someone else for the construction of a swimming
pool, which the defendant later conveyed to a country club. The court there held that the
defendant functioned as a builder of the improvements, rather than an owner, because it super-
vised construction of the pool, inspected the improvement upon completion,, and never in-
tended to maintain possession or control of the facility. 696 S.W.2d at 922. Unfortunately, the
court in Dubin fails to delineate any of the facts surrounding Carrier's involvement in con-
struction of the wall heater, so the parallels to McCulloch are not obvious from the opinion.
Dubin, 731 S.W.2d at 654-55.
131. 731 S.W.2d at 654.
132. 734 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1987, no writ).
133. Id. at 91. Section 16.009 does not bar an action "based on willful misconduct or
fraudulent concealment in connection with the performance of the construction or repair."
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009(e)(3) (Vernon 1986).
134. 734 S.W.2d at 91. The court held that plaintiff's conclusory allegations of fraudulent
concealment, which were unsupported by affidavit, did not create an issue of material fact. Id
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censed in Texas when the plaintiff's pleading specifically alleges that the de-
fendant was an engineering firm.' 35 According to the court, only
"registered" and "licensed" engineers may call themselves engineers or prac-
tice engineering in Texas. 136 The court noted that it would be bizarre to
require defendants who are sued as engineers to produce proof that they are




Two decisions during the Survey period addressed procedural issues in-
volving class actions. In Grant v. Austin Bridge Construction Co. 138 128
named plaintiffs filed suit individually and as representatives of a class of
approximately 2,000 persons owning property around a lake in Walker
County, Texas. The property owners claimed damages resulting from pollu-
tion to the lake allegedly caused by defendants' nearby construction. More
than five years after the suit was commenced, the trial court certified the
class pursuant to rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 139 Shortly
thereafter, defendants served each of the 128 named representatives with a
set of interrogatories and request for admissions. After only eight of the
class representatives filed timely responses to the requested discovery, the
trial court decertified the class and struck the pleadings of the 120 non-re-
sponding plaintiffs named in the suit.
The first issue presented on appeal was whether the trial court's order of
decertification constituted a non-appealable interlocutory order.140 After
analyzing the specific language of rule 42(c),14 1 the court of appeals con-
cluded that a withdrawal of certification at any point in the suit is tanta-
mount to a refusal to certify the class in the first place. ' 42 Consequently, the
court held that the appeal was authorized by a statutory exception permit-
ting appeals from interlocutory orders refusing to certify a class.' 4 3 With
respect to the merits of the decertification order, the court held that the trial
judge had not abused his discretion since over 90% of the named plaintiffs
failed to respond to interrogatories thereby demonstrating that the class was
135. 734 S.W.2d at 91. The applicable limitations period set forth in section 16.008 applies
only to "a registered or licensed architect or engineer in this state." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.008(a) (Vernon 1986).
136. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3271a, §§ 1.1, .2, .3, 2 (Vernon 1968) (Texas
Engineering Practice Act, setting forth definition and qualifications for engineers).
137. 734 S.W.2d at 92.
138. 725 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
139. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
140. 725 S.W.2d at 368. Except as authorized by statute, no appeal lies from an interlocu-
tory order. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross, 698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 1985).
141. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1) provides first for determination of class status by the trial
court. In the next sentence the rule states that the trial court may alter, amend or withdraw
certification at any time before final judgment. Id.
142. 725 S.W.2d at 368.
143. 725 S.W.2d at 368. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon 1986)
provides: "A person may appeal from an interlocutory order.., that... (3) certifies or refuses
to certify a class in a suit brought under Rule 42 .... "
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not represented by parties who could or would fairly and adequately protect
the class interests. 144 Since most of the named plaintiffs had also admitted
comparative negligence by virtue of failing to respond to defendants' request
for admissions, the court concluded further that the plaintiffs had failed to
meet the typicality requirement of rule 42(a)(3) because none of the un-
named class members had made any such admission of negligence. 145
Finally, addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that the
statute of limitations would not bar individual causes of action thereafter
brought by unnamed property owners. 146 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied upon decisions in the federal courts holding that the filing of the
original class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all
asserted members of the class. 147 Thus, the limitations period remaining on
the unnamed plaintiffs' individual causes of action tolled from the date suit
was filed to the date the court decertified class. 148
According to the court in Life Insurance Co. v. Brister,149 the mere exist-
ence of questions of law or fact common to the members of a class is insuffi-
cient to support class certification under rule 42(b)150 unless such questions
predominate over the issues requiring individual adjudication for each class
member. The test for evaluating the predominance issue is not whether the
common questions outnumber the individual issues, but whether common or
individual issues will be the object of most of the litigants' and courts' ef-
forts.I5 Although plaintiffs shoulder the burden of proving predominance
of common issues at the certification stage, 152 the class proponents need not
prove a prima facie case to obtain certification.' 53 Indeed, the court may
determine maintainability of a class action based on the pleadings alone.154
Finally, the court noted that trial judges should err in favor of certification
when making the determination at an early stage of the proceeding because
the parties may not have fully developed the supporting facts and the court
may always modify or withdraw the certification later. 15 5 The court did not
find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in certifying the class. 156
144. 725 S.W.2d at 369; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(4) (class action maintainable only if the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class).
145. 725 S.W.2d at 370; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(3) (class action maintainable only if
claims or defenses of representative parties are typical of the class).
146. 725 S.W.2d at 370.
147. Id. (citing Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983); American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974)).
148. 725 S.W.2d at 370.
149. 722 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
150. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4) provides that an action may be maintained as a class action
if, in addition to satisfying the prerequisites of rule 42(a), the action presents questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class that predominate over any questions affecting only
individual class members.
151. 722 S.W.2d at 772.
152. Id. at 770.
153. Id. at 772-73. The court may decertify the class under TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1) if
common questions do not predominate at trial. 722 S.W.2d at 775.
154. Id. at 772-73.
155. Id. at 774-75.





Apparently in an effort to conserve file space and to reduce costs, the
supreme court eliminated filing requirements for depositions and certain
other discovery documents.15 7 Pursuant to amended rule 206,158 the deposi-
tion officer (or court reporter) no longer files depositions with the court. 159
Instead, the officer delivers the original deposition to the attorney who asked
the first question appearing in the transcript. 160 This attorney, known as the
"custodial attorney," must make the original deposition available, upon rea-
sonable request, for inspection or copying by the other parties to the suit.1 61
With respect to exhibits, rule 206 now contains a procedure whereby the
deposition officer must return all original documents marked as exhibits to
the party or witness producing them.1 62 The party or witness who originally
produced the documents must maintain the originals and produce them for
hearing or trial upon seven days notice. 163 The deposition officer must an-
nex copies of the originals to the original deposition and those copies may be
used for all purposes. 164 As an alternative procedure, a party or witness may
produce copies at a deposition, provided the other parties have a fair oppor-
tunity to verify the copies by comparison with the originals. 165
The supreme court also amended the rules to conform to agreements cus-
tomarily reached by counsel regarding depositions. Rule 205,166 as
amended, provides that the witness may sign the deposition transcript before
any officer authorized to administer an oath, e.g., a notary public.1 67 New
rule 166c 68 provides that the parties may, by written agreement, modify
deposition procedures, such as the time, place, and manner of the deposi-
tion. 1 69 The "written agreement" may simply be an agreement recorded in
the deposition transcript. 170 Rule 204171 also authorizes the parties to vary
the objection procedure, such as an agreement that all objections, including
those as to form and responsiveness of answers, may be made at trial without
waiver. 172
In addition, rule 205 now prohibits a witness from erasing or obliterating
157. TEX. R. Civ. P. 206; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 196, 198 (Vernon 1976) (providing for return
of depositions to court).











169. See also id. 206(4) (parties may agree contrary to rule 205).
170. Id.
171. Id. 204.
172. Id. The rule sets forth standard objection waivers. Id. 204(4).
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the deposition transcript when making changes. 173 Rather, the witness must
submit a written statement of the changes and the reasons supporting them
to the deposition officer.174 Finally, the supreme court amended rule 207,175
which governs the use of a deposition at trial, primarily in two respects. A
party may use a deposition against another party joined after the deposition
was taken if (i) the newly joined party has interest similar to any party who
was present or had notice of the deposition; and (ii) after joinder, the new
party had a reasonable opportunity to redepose the deponent and failed to
do so.1 76 The rule was also amended to specify that a party may use deposi-
tions taken in a different proceeding in another case subject to the provisions
and requirements of the rules of evidence.1 77
B. Written Discovery
For the benefit of plaintiffs' counsel, rules 167178 and 168179 now provide
that a plaintiff may serve interrogatories and requests for production of doc-
uments without leave of court, upon a defendant at the same time as the
service of the petition. In that circumstance, the defendant may serve writ-
ten responses, answers and objections within fifty (50) days after service of
the petition and citation. °80 With respect to objections, rule 168 now con-
tains a provision in conformity with prior case law to the effect that objec-
tions served after the time for answer are waived unless good cause is shown
for such failure.' 8'
Rule 169182 governing requests for admissions as amended specifies that,
upon a showing of good cause by the party responding, the trial court may
allow a party to withdraw or amend a response.18 3 The court must find that
the parties relying on the response "will not be unduly prejudiced" and the
presentation of the merits of the case will be served.' 84 Previously, the bur-
den was on the party who obtained the admission to show that withdrawal
of the amendment would prejudice him.1 85
As in the case of depositions, new rule 166c086 authorizes the parties, by
written agreement, to modify the procedures as to other methods of discov-
ery, including written discovery.' 8 7 In addition, interrogatories, requests for








180. Id. 167(2), 168(4).
181. Hobson v. Moore, 734 S.W.2d 340, 340-41 (Tex. 1987) (privilege objection waived
where made six days after answers were due). This rule is codified in TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(6).
182. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
183. Id. 169(2).
184. Id.
185. Tex. R. Civ. P. 169 (Vernon 1976).




tions, are no longer filed with the court.188 No change, however, was made
to the filing procedures for requests for admissions and responses, which the
party making the request or objection must still file.189
C. Privileges and Exemptions
The Rule Amendments
The supreme court made a number of relatively minor changes to the pro-
vision of rule 166b, which delineates the privileges and exemptions from dis-
covery. 190 With respect to work product of an attorney, the rule now makes
that exemption subject to exceptions for attorney-client privilege contained
in evidence rule 503(d). 191 A written statement of a witness remains exempt
from discovery if the witness made the statement (i) subsequent to the occur-
rence or transaction upon which the suit is based and (ii) in connection with
the prosecution or defense of the suit or in anticipation of prosecution or
defense of claims made in pending litigation. 192
The supreme court changed the language of the rule concerning the inves-
tigative privilege or confidential party communications, apparently to con-
form to recent supreme court decisions. Amended rule 166b-3 provides that
communications between a party and his agents, representatives and em-
ployees are protected when (i) made subsequent to the occurrence or trans-
action upon which the suit is based; and (ii) in anticipation of the
prosecution or defense of the claims made a part of the pending litigation.193
Also consistent with a prior supreme court decision,' 94 the rule states that a
photograph is not a communication. 195
The supreme court made one significant modification in regard to the dis-
covery exemptions. Rule 166b now provides that a party may obtain witness
statements and party communications, which are otherwise protected. The
party seeking discovery must show that he (i) has substantial need of the
materials; and (ii) is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of them by other means. 196
Case Law
In Channel Two Television Co. v. Dickerson 197 the court addressed the
privilege applicable to a reporter's investigative materials. After a television
broadcast regarding a pending lawsuit, one of the parties sought to compel
188. Id. 167, 168.
189. Id. 169(1).
190. Id. 166b.
191. Id. 166b(3)(a); see also TEX. R. EvID. 503(d) (setting forth exceptions to general rule
of attorney-client privilege).
192. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(3)(c).
193. Id. 166(3)(d).
194. Terry v. Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Tex. 1985).
195. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(3)(d).
196. Id. 166b(3). The exemption applies to witness statements and party communications
only. Id.
197. 725 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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production of the reporter's notes and other documents relating to the
broadcast. Relying on a United States Supreme Court decision198 and provi-
sion of the state constitution'99 regarding freedom of the press, the court of
appeals held that once the reporter asserted the privilege, the party seeking
discovery must make a "clear and specific" showing that the information
was (1) highly material and relevant; (2) necessary or critical to the mainte-
nance of the claim; and (3) not obtainable from other sources. 2°° Finding
that the party seeking production had not mae such a showing in this case,
the court denied the requested discovery. 201
The "AIDS" controversy did not escape the attention of the Texas courts.
In a wrongful death action, the plaintiff in Tarrant County Hospital District
v. Hughes202 claimed that the defendant hospital gave the deceased a blood
transfusion that resulted in her contracting Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). By a request for production of documents, plaintiff
sought to discover the names and addresses of blood donors. Over an objec-
tion based on the physician-patient privilege and the donors' right of pri-
vacy, the district court allowed the discovery, but ordered plaintiff not to
contact the donors or to seek further discovery regarding them without
court permission.
The Fort Worth court of appeals, sitting en banc, decided that the district
judge had acted correctly. 203 The appellate court held the physician-patient
privilege inapplicable because the blood donors had not seen a physician or
received medical care when they donated blood. 2°4 With respect to the do-
nors' right of privacy, the court ruled that plaintiff's need for the informa-
tion outweighed the privacy interest, especially in light of the provision in
the trial court order prohibiting further discovery without leave of court.205
The scope of the privilege for party communications made in connection
with prosecution or defense of the action 206 continued to generate substan-
tial court attention. In Estate of Gilbert v. Black 207 the court held that an
insurer's internal communication generated prior to the denial of issuance
coverage were not within the scope of the privilege. 208 In Phelps Dodge Re-
fining Corp. v. Marsh209 the defendant-employer sought advice from his
counsel after an accident resulted in the death of an employee. On advice of
counsel that a lawsuit was likely, the employer conducted a post-accident
investigation prior to the time plaintiff made a claim. Notwithstanding the
198. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972) (first amendment does not pro-
tect reporter from testifying before grand jury).
199. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 8.
200. 725 S.W.2d at 472.
201. Id.
202. 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (en banc).
203. Id. at 676.
204. 734 S.W.2d at 677; see also TEX. R. EvID. 509(a) (defining patient as one who seeks
medical care).
205. 734 S.W.2d at 679.
206. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d) (exemption for party communications).
207. 722 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
208. Id. at 550.
209. 733 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
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attorney's accurate prediction, the court of appeals held that the investiga-
tive materials were discoverable. 210 Finally, in Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc. v.
Moore211 the court held that witness statements taken by a claims examiner
at the time of an accident were not covered by the privilege when no one had
made any claim at that point.212
D. Procedure For Claiming Privilege or Exemption
As noted in a prior Survey,213 the supreme court in Peeples v. Honorable
Fourth Supreme Judicial District2 1 4 outlined the procedures for making and
preserving objections to exclude items from discovery on grounds of privi-
lege. 215 The amended rule 166b 216 now incorporates the procedure outlined
in Peeples. In order to exclude any matter from discovery on the basis of an
exemption or immunity, a party must specifically plead the particular ex-
emption or immunity.217 The party must also support the claimed privilege
by either producing affidavits or presenting live testimony at a hearing re-
quested by either the requesting party or the objecting party.218 If the party
objects to discovery based on a specific immunity or exemption, such as at-
torney-client privilege or work product, and the trial court determines that
an in camera inspection is necessary, the objecting party must segregate and
produce the documents for that inspection.219 If the party objects to discov-
ery based on undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment or annoyance,
or invasion of personal, constitutional or property rights, the trial court may
rule on the objection without conducting an in camera inspection first.2 20
Several Texas courts considered the application of the procedure pre-
scribed in the Peeples opinion before the codification of that procedure in
rule 116b. In two cases the appellate court denied a claimed privilege when
the objecting party failed to follow the Peeples guidelines. In Medical Protec-
tive Co. v. Glanz22 1 the objecting party presented its objections to discovery
in a letter to the trial court that accompanied the documents produced for an
in camera inspection. The letter pointed out that the discovery requests
were too general and that the documents produced were privileged. The
appellate court held that the objecting party had not met the guidelines pre-
scribed in Peeples since the letter did not specifically point out which privi-
lege was claimed for the documents. 222 In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v.
210. Id. at 361. The court held that a party has good cause to anticipate a lawsuit only
upon some outward manifestations of future litigation by someone having a potential claim.
Id.
211. 731 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
212. Id. at 140.
213. See Figari, Graves & Dwyer, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 103, at 508-09.
214. 701 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1985).
215. Id. at 637.





221. 721 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd).
222. Id. at 385.
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Speaus 223 an insurance company contended that its investigative files were
privileged from discovery in an action for recovery on a policy and damages
for the insurance company's bad faith in its handling of the insurance claim.
The company claimed that the investigative materials were not discoverable
with respect to the bad faith claim until the underlying claim on the policy
had been determined. The court of appeals denied the objection because the
insurance company had failed to satisfy the Peeples requirements when it did
not produce evidence concerning the claimed privilege in the trial court.224
In several cases courts expanded the Peeples guidelines outside the area of
privilege. In two decisions, Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Jones223 and Brad
Caraway & Associates v. Moye,226 the court of appeals held that the guide-
lines in Peeples are also applicable to objections to discovery based on lack of
relevancy to the subject matter of the action.227 Apparently foreseeing the
change to rule 166b(4), the court of appeals, in Independent Insulating
Glass/Southwest, Inc. v. Street,228 extended the Peeples requirements to in-
clude a case involving an objection to discovery on grounds of unduly bur-
densome, costly, or harassing discovery. 229
Finally, in Garcia v. Peeples230 the defendant car manufacturer sought a
protective order regarding the disclosure of trade secret information about
its fuel-system design. The defendant supported its request with affidavits.
Although the district court did not conduct an in camera inspection before it
issued a protective order, the supreme court held that such inspection was
not mandatory. 231 Since the instant case involved a restriction on the dis-
semination of information by the party seeking discovery and not a restric-
tion on the flow of information to the requesting party, the court did not
apply the Peeples procedures. 232 The supreme court, however, decided that
the protective order granted by the lower court was too restrictive because it
prevented disclosure of information to litigants with similar suits against
automakers.233 In its opinion the high court strongly endorsed the policy of
allowing shared discovery among parties in similar actions.234
E. Sanctions
Since 1984, rule 215235 has provided that a party who fails to supplement
a response to a discovery request is subject to sanctions.236 The court shall
223. 730 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
224. Id. at 823 (insurance company required to show that the documents were needed to
prove only the bad faith claim).
225. 733 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ).
226. 724 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ).
227. Valley Forge, 733 S.W.2d at 321; Brad Caraway, 724 S.W.2d at 893.
228. 722 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
229. Id. at 802.
230. 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987).
231. Id. at 345.
232. Id. at 345-46.
233. Id. at 346-47.
234. Id. at 347-48.




not allow the party to present the evidence that it was obligated to provide in
the supplement, unless the court finds "good cause" for admission. 237  An
amendment to the rule now places the burden on the party offering the evi-
dence to demonstrate the good cause for its introduction.23  The amend-
ment also expands the sanction to include a party's failure to respond to a
discovery request.239
A number of cases addressed the situation in which a party failed to list a
witness in its response to a discovery request and then sought to introduce
testimony from that surprise witness. In each of these cases the court barred
the witness from testifying. In Guitterrez v. Dallas Independent School Dis-
trict 240 the plaintiff served an interrogatory inquiring as to names and ad-
dresses of all witnesses the defendant planned to call at trial. In response,
the defendant did not object and provided information about certain per-
sons. At trial, the court allowed the defendant to present the testimony of an
undisclosed expert over the objection of the plaintiff. Despite reversing the
district court's decision, the supreme court noted that the form of the inter-
rogatory was objectionable as it asked for all witnesses and was not limited
to inquiry about expert witnesses only.24I The court determined, however,
that the defendant had waived any objection to the form of the interrogatory
by answering in a misleading fashion and that the sanction of disallowing the
testimony of the undisclosed expert was automatic.242 The court noted that
since the sanction was automatic, the plaintiff could not be forced to accept a
continuance of the trial in lieu of barring the testimony of the witness. 243
In E. F Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood 244 the Texas Supreme Court applied
rule 215 to the nondisclosure of an expert witness on the issue of reasonable
attorneys fees. The court found that the plaintiffs had not shown good cause
for introduction of the expert testimony even though the opposing party had
special knowledge to cross-examine the undisclosed expert and the plaintiffs
had not decided to call the expert until the time of trial. 245 Similarly, in
Williams v. Union Carbide Corp.246 the court of appeals held that the party
offering an undisclosed expert did not show good cause for allowing the ex-
pert to testify even when the attorney for that party did not know about the
proposed witness until two days before trial. 247 The court's holding was
based on the fact that the attorney's client knew of the witness' existence and
expertise two years prior to the trial. 248
237. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
238. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
239. Id.
240. 729 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1987).
241. Id. at 693; see Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 511 S.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court distinguished those knowing relevant
facts and other witnesses, who are not subject to discovery).
242. 729 S.W.2d at 694.
243. Id.
244. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. 65 (Nov. 10, 1987).
245. Id.
246. 734 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




Finally, in American Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson 249 a defendant, Lederle,
relied on a statement in his designation of experts that purported to reserve
the right to call all experts designated to testify by other parties. The other
defendants in the case designated two experts as witnesses but subsequently
redesignated the experts as consultants. The court of appeals held that the
catch-all reservation by Lederle was insufficient and that the trial court
properly disallowed the testimony of the experts when Lederle called them
as witnesses. 250
X. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Rule 18a, 25 1 which governs the disqualification of judges, provides that
any party may file a motion for disqualification at least ten days before the
date set for trial. 252 Before the case proceedings can continue, the judge to
whom the motion is directed must either recuse himself or refer the motion
to the presiding judge of the district for determination. 25 3 In Houston North
Properties v. White 254 the appellants complained that the trial judge failed to
exercise either of two permitted options when the appellants filed a motion
to disqualify two days after the trial commenced. The court of appeals re-
jected the appellants' argument, however, finding nothing in the record that
justified the tardiness of the motion.255 According to the court, a motion to
recuse must be timely filed in order to trigger the mandatory provisions of
rule 18a.
2 5 6
Although two different judges presided over the landmark jury trial in
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 257 Texaco considered neither judge satisfactory
and unsuccessfully attempted to disqualify each. Three months into the
trial, retired district judge Solomon Casseb replaced Judge Farris, who had
to step down because of ill health. Following entry of the judgment, Texaco
moved to disqualify Judge Casseb based on a newspaper article that alleged
that Casseb had not completed the years of service required for retirement
status before he replaced Farris.258 Although Judge Casseb forwarded Tex-
aco's motion to the district's presiding judge for a hearing, in accordance
with rule 18a,259 the presiding judge did not conduct a separate hearing on
the recusal motion.
After observing that Judge Casseb's retirement status had been certified by
249. 732 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
250. Id. at 655.
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
252. Id. 18a(a).
253. Id. 18a(c), (d).
254. 731 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
255. Id. at 722.
256. Id.
257. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. Since Judge Casseb was not holding judicial office when he replaced Farris, under
Texas law he could only qualify as a retired judge subject to assignment if he had accrued 12
years of service. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.054 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 19878); TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. tit. 110B, § 44. 101(a)(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1988).
259. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(d).
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the chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court before commencement of the
trial, the court of appeals held that the proper method for attacking the qual-
ifications of a retired judge is through a quo warranto proceeding directly
against the judge, not through a collateral attack under the guise of rule 18a,
which Texaco had attempted. 26° The court also found no error in the pre-
siding judge's refusal to conduct a hearing on Texaco's motion, holding that
rule 18a does not mandate a hearing unless the recusal motion states valid
grounds for disqualification. 261
The court of appeals was equally unimpressed with Texaco's efforts to
disqualify Judge Farris, who originally presided over the trial court proceed-
ings. Citing canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct,262 Texaco moved to
disqualify Judge Farris before trial on the basis of an appearance of impro-
priety created by a $10,000 campaign contribution and service on Judge Far-
ris's campaign steering committee by Pennzoil's lead counsel. The court of
appeals held, however, that article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution263
contains the sole bases under Texas law for the disqualification of a judge.264
Since Texaco failed to allege any constitutional grounds for disqualification,
the judge assigned to hear the motion simply had no basis to disqualify
Judge Farris, notwithstanding the provisions of canon 3C.265 The court like-
wise dismissed Texaco's claim that the Texas Constitution's limitation on
the bases for disqualification of a judge deprived Texaco of due process be-
cause the court found no evidence in the record that Judge Farris was either
biased or prejudiced in any manner or that he enjoyed any pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the case. 2 6 6
Although it came much too late to benefit Texaco, the recent enactment of
amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure expands the grounds for
disqualification and recusal of judges in Texas. New rule 18b, which par-
tially tracks the language of canon 3C, provides that judges shall recuse
260. 729 S.W.2d at 855.
261. Id. at 856.
262. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, app. B at 114 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (reporting
the Code of Judicial Conduct).
263. TEX. CONST. art. V, § I 1 prohibits a judge from sitting in any case in which he may be
interested, or when he is related to a party by affinity or consanguinity in a degree prescribed
by law, or when he was counsel in the case.
264. 729 S.W.2d at 842-43. The Texaco court distinguished that case from the case of
Manges v. Garcia, 616 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). 729 S.W.2d
at 843. In Manges the court of appeals held that canon 3C contemplates that a judge's refusal
to sit in a case may be based on a reason not included in the Texas Constitution. 616 S.W.2d at
382. The Texaco court distinguished between the two cases on the basis that the trial judge in
Manges voluntarily recused himself. 729 S.W.2d at 843.
265. 729 S.W.2d at 844. A similar effect resulted from the decision in the case of A.H. Belo
Corp. v. Southern Methodist Univ., 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ), in
which the court did not find any basis under the Texas Constitution to disqualify the trial
judge, even though the trial judge's financial support of the defendant university's booster
group, the Mustang Club, qualified him as a representative of the university under article 3 of
the NCAA Constitution. Id. at 722.
266. 729 S.W.2d at 845. The court also observed that most judicial disqualification matters
do not rise to a constitutional level and that only in extreme cases would the constitution
require disqualification of a judge on the basis of bias and prejudice. Id. at 844 (citing Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)).
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themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned due to, among other things, personal bias or prejudice concerning
the subject matter or parties involved.267 The rule also lists three grounds
for mandatory disqualification of judges, essentially repeating the bases for
judicial disqualification set forth in the Texas Constitution. 268 The amended
rule 18a, which governs the procedure for recusal or disqualification, re-
quires the moving party to now verify its motion and state with particularity
the grounds for disqualification or recusal. 269 In addition, if the presiding
judge or the judge designated by him determines that the moving party
brought a motion to recuse solely for the purpose of delay and without suffi-
cient cause, the judge hearing the motion may, upon motion of the opposing
party, impose any sanction authorized by rule 215(2)(b).270 No doubt, with
this amendment to rule 18a the rulemakers intended to eliminate the prac-
tice of using motions to disqualify as a delaying tactic.
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A number of cases during the Survey period involved the form of evidence
that either supports or defeats a motion for summary judgment. In a suit for
breach of an aircraft leasing agreement, the plaintiff in Republic National
Leasing Corp. v. Schindler271 submitted the only summary judgment evi-
dence, an affidavit of its credit manager. The affidavit stated that the defend-
ant failed to make certain lease payments and gave the amount of claimed
damages. Disagreeing with the court of appeals' conclusion that the matters
in the affidavit could not be readily controverted as no discovery had been
performed, 272 the supreme court ruled that the affidavit properly supported
a summary judgment.273 The supreme court also held that the trial court
properly authenticated under rule 166a copies of documents attached to the
affidavit, which the affidavit swore were true and correct. 274 In MBank
Brenham, N.A. v. Barrera275 the defendant claimed that a fact issue existed
based on an admission contained in the plaintiff's original petition, even
though the plaintiff's amended petition did not contain the same admission.
The supreme court disagreed, however, because the defendant failed to au-
thenticate the abandoned pleading by attaching it to an affidavit or by other
means.
2 76
267. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(2).
268. See id. 18b(l); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
269. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(a). The moving party must also make the motion based on per-
sonal knowledge and the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. Id.
The motion may state facts based upon information and belief if the motion specifically states
the grounds for such belief. Id.
270. Id. 18a(h); see id. 215(2)(b).
271. 717 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1986).
272. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
273. 717 S.W.2d at 607.
274. Id.
275. 721 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. 1986).
276. Id. at 842.
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In Cheatham v. Allstate of Texas, Inc.,277 a suit for the brokerage commis-
sion rising out of the sale of a business, the defendant filed an affidavit claim-
ing that he had not purchased the particular business in question but had
only purchased certain personal assets. The court of appeals decided that
such statements did not constitute summary judgment evidence since they
were merely contentions as to the proper interpretation of a written contract
related to the transaction. 278 Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary
judgment granted by the trial court.279 The court of appeals in Woods v.
Applemark Enterprises, Inc.280 held that an affidavit was not defective
merely because the affiant did not state that the statements contained in the
affidavit were true and correct.281 The court noted that the affidavit recited
that the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts set forth and that it
contained a proper verification by a notary public. 282
Two cases considered issues related to the timing of materials submitted in
connection with a summary judgment motion. In Energo International
Corp. v. Modern Industrial Heating, Inc. 283 the defendant filed an amended
answer on the day of the summary judgment hearing. Observing that courts
consider a summary judgment hearing to be a trial for purposes of rule 63,
which governs the filing of amended pleadings without leave of court, 284 the
appellate court ruled that the answer was untimely and would not defeat the
motion for summary judgment.285 In reaching that result, the court disre-
garded an entry on the trial court's docket sheet that indicated the trial court
had granted leave for the defendant to file the amended pleadings. 286 Ac-
cording to the court of appeals, a clerk makes a docket entry only for the
convenience of the clerk and the trial court and not as part of the record.287
In City of Dallas v. Continental Airlines, Inc.28 8 the movant filed a reply brief
with additional evidence only three days before a summary judgment hear-
ing. Based on the provision in rule 16a 289 requiring a movant to file all
supporting evidence at least twenty-one days prior to hearing, the nonmov-
ant filed a motion to strike, which the trial court denied. The court of ap-
peals presumed that the trial court had impliedly granted leave for the filing
of the reply materials by denying the motion to strike and, thus, that evi-
dence was properly part of the evidence. 29°
Rule 166a(c) 29 1 requires the party seeking summary judgment to file and
277. 730 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
278. Id. at 427.
279. Id.
280. 729 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
281. Id. at 330.
282. Id.
283. 722 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
284. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.
285. 722 S.W.2d at 152.
286. Id. at 151.
287. Id.
288. 735 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
289. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
290. 735 S.W.2d at 500-01.
291. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
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serve its motion for summary judgment at least twenty-one days before the
time specified for hearing. In Williams v. City of Angleton 292 the court of
appeals concluded that the calculation of the twenty-one day period must
exclude the day of the notice and the day of the hearing.293 Employing that
method of computation, the court found in this case that the nonmovant
received only twenty days notice of the hearing.294 Even though the trial
court recessed the hearing for one day, the appellate court decided that sum-
mary judgment was improperly granted in light of the lack of timely no-
tice.295 In Davis v. Davis296 the nonmovant plaintiff did not receive twenty-
one days notice of the motions for summary judgment filed by two of the
three defendants in the case. The court of appeals, however, held that the
nonmovant waived any error due to lack of notice because the nonmovant
participated in the hearing and did not object, seek a continuance, or file a
motion for new trial to preserve error.297
As noted earlier in this article,298 parties no longer file depositions, inter-
rogatory answers, and responses to requests for documents with the court or
the clerk. In an effort to make rule 166a consistent with that change, the
rule now provides that the trial court may consider deposition transcripts,
interrogatory answers, and other discovery responses that the parties refer-
ence or set forth in the motion or response.299 The trial court, however, can
only consider admissions contained in responses to requests for admissions if
the parties have filed them at the time of the hearing. 3°°
XII. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
Rule Changes. Since 1973, the rules have allowed the trial courts to sub-
mit special issues in "broad-form" rather than by separate questions with
respect to each element of the case.301 In recent years the supreme court has
strongly indicated its preference for the broad submission form.302 Now,
rule 277303 specifically indicates a strong preference for the broad-form as
well. 304 The rulesmakers also amended the same rule to provide that the
court may require affirmative findings of liability before it submits a damage
question to the jury.305
The rulesmakers made other changes to the rules governing special issues,
but most were changes of form rather than substance. In conformity with
292. 724 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
293. Id. at 417.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. 734 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
297. Id. at 712.
298. No copy.
299. See supra notes 157-189 and accompanying text.
300. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
301. Id.
302. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
303. Eg., Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 19984).
304. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
305. Rule 277 provides that "[iln all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit
the cause upon broad-form questions [rather than 'issues']." Id. (emphasis added).
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existing practice a provision was added to rule 272306 that requires parties to
object to the charge outside the presence of the jury.307 The rules have long
provided that the court must support issues with the pleadings and evi-
dence. 308 The provision in the rules now requires the court to also submit to
the jury instructions and definitions raised by the pleadings and evidence. 3°9
Finally, in cases in which the jury's answers are in conflict, the rules now
directs the trial court to instruct the jury, in writing, of the nature of the
conflict, unresponsiveness or incompleteness of the answers and to provide
the jury with additional instructions, if proper.310
Case Law. The trend of supreme court decisions on special issues continued
to favor plaintiffs. In Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital,31' a negli-
gence action against a number of doctors and a hospital, the trial court sub-
mitted a broad-form negligence issue that the defendants claimed as worded,
indicated to the jury that in the trial court's opinion the plaintiff had shown
proximate cause. 312 The supreme court disagreed with the defendant's con-
tention and held that any comment by the trial court was incidental. 31 3 The
court also approved the trial court's definition of ordinary care that refer-
enced the degree of care that a hospital would have exercised "under the
same or similar circumstances" rather than referring to a hospital "in this or
similar communities. '314
In Placencio v. Allied Industrial International, Inc.,315 a products liability
case, the defendant submitted certain misuse issues but did not condition the
issue regarding the percentage of causation attributable to the misuse of the
product on an affirmative finding of proximate cause by such misuse. The
supreme court held that the trial court had not erred in refusing to submit
the misuse issues.316 The court found that the defendant's misuse issues as-
sumed the truth of certain material controverted facts and therefore, accord-
ing to the court, the requested issues were not substantially correct in
form.3 17 Rule 278 requires a party to submit a substantially correctly
worded issue in order to preserve error.318
Finally, in Wilgus v. Bond3 1 9 the plaintiff brought an action for breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion. Although issues were submitted to
306. Id.
307. Id. 272.
308. See id; Tex. R. Civ. P. 272 (Vernon 1976).
309. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 279 (Vernon 1977).
310. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
311. Id. 295.
312. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. 36 (Oct. 28, 1987).
313. The issue asked whether the the jury found that the defendant was "negligent in the
care and treatment of [the plaintiff] with respect to any [treatment] which was a proximate
cause of her [injury.]" Id. at 39.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 38.
316. 724 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1987).
317. Id. at 21.
318. Id.
319. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
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the jury on all three theories, the damage issue inquired as to what sum of
money would reasonably compensate the plaintiff for its damages rather
than tying the issue to any particular theory. The high court agreed that a
jury must measure damages with a legal standard, but held that the defend-
ant waived any error by failing to object on that ground in the trial court.320
' Two court of appeals decisions addressed some interesting points about
special issues. In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonough,32' a
worker's compensation case, the trial court's damage issue did not indicate
that the jury could answer "none" in response. Although the defendant
made a valid objection to the issue in the lower court on that basis, the court
of appeals found that the trial court committed no reversible error.322 The
appellate court noted that the jury answered "0" to another damage issue
and, thus, the court presumed the jury knew that it could answer similarly to
other damage issues.3 23 In Souris v. Robinson 324 the trial court instructed a
jury to try to make its decision that day. The jury came back the same day
with a verdict. The court of appeals held that the instruction was not coer-
cive, especially since the evidence in the record indicated that the jurors did
not feel coerced. 325
XIII. JURY PRACTICE
The amendments to the rules changed the time limit for making a request
for a jury trial. Under amended rule 216,326 a party must file a written re-
quest for jury trial within a reasonable time before the trial date on the non-
jury docket, but no less than 30 days before that date. 327 In addition, the
jury fee is now ten dollars for the district court and five dollars for the
county court. 328
The amendments have also modified the time limit for demanding a jury
trial in the justice courts. Except for forcible entry and detainer suits, the
rules require a party desiring a jury in the justice courts to make such a
demand not less than one day in advance of the trial date and to deposit a
jury fee of five dollars. 329 In forcible entry and detainer cases a party must
make a jury request within five days from the date of service on the defend-
ant and, in addition, the requesting party must pay a jury fee of five
dollars. 330
The supreme court considered the procedures for demanding a jury trial
in Citizens State Bank v. Caney Investments.331 In Caney Investments the
320. 30 Tex. S. Ct. J. 460 (May 27, 1987).
321. Id. at 461.
322. 734 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
323. Id. at 71.
324. Id. at 70-71.
325. 725 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1987, no writ).
326. Id. at 343.







court held that a trial court must honor a timely demand for a jury trial with
respect to an application for a permanent injunction, even if the court had
previously set the matter on the nonjury docket. 332 In this case, the trial
court set the case during a week when the court had not called any jury
panels. The plaintiff subsequently made a timely jury demand under rule
216 and paid the appropriate fee. The trial court refused to allow a jury trial
because the court had given the matter priority and had set it during a non-
jury week. 333 The supreme court, however, ruled that the trial court's action
was an egregious error and that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial. 33 4
As noted in a prior survey,335 a juror may no longer testify as to any
matter or statement that occurred during the course of a jury's deliberations
under rule 327336 and evidence rule 606(b).3 37 Under those rules, however, a
juror may testify whether anyone improperly brought any outside influence
to bear upon any juror.33 8 In Weaver v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co.3 39
the supreme court gave a restrictive interpretation to application of rule.3 4 0
In this worker's compensation suit the plaintiff-employee filed an affidavit of
one of the jurors in support of a motion for new trial, which was denied by
the trial court. The affidavit alleged that the jurors discussed that no one
from the employee's company had appeared to testify on behalf of the em-
ployee, that the persons who had observed the accident causing the em-
ployee's injury had not appeared to testify, and that the employee should
have had hospitalization insurance. The supreme court held that the juror's
affidavit did not show any evidence of outside influence; therefore, the trial
court properly overruled the employee's motion for new trial. 341
XIV. DISMISSAL AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
The rule amendments also modified the rules related to voluntary dismis-
sal, nonsuit, and dismissal for want of prosecution. The rulesmakers
amended rule 162 in order to fix a definite time after which a party may not
voluntarily dismiss or nonsuit a cause of action. Under the amended rule, a
plaintiff may take a dismissal or nonsuit at any time before he has introduced
all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence. 34 2 In addition, the rule au-
thorizes the clerk to tax costs against the dismissing party unless otherwise
332. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. 24 (Oct. 21, 1987).
333. Id. at 24-25.
334. 733 S.W.2d 581, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. 24
(Oct. 21, 1987).
335. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 24; see Ex. Parte Allison, 99 Tex. 455, 456, 90 S.W. 870, 871 (1906)
(party has right to jury in hearing for a permanent injunction).
336. See Figari, Graves & Dwyer, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 121, at 453.
337. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b).
338. TEX. R. EVID. 606(b).
339. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b); TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
340. 30 Tex. S. Ct. J. 617 (Sept. 16, 1987).
341. Id. at 617.
342. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162. The supreme court repealed rule 164, which had governed non-




ordered by the court.3 43
Rule 165a,344 which governs dismissal for want of prosecution, now pro-
vides that the trial court may set a case for a dismissal hearing or place the
case on the dismissal docket when a party seeking affirmative relief fails to
appear for any hearing or trial of which he had notice345 or when the trial
court fails to dispose of the case within the time standards declared by the
supreme court under its administrative rules. 346 An important provision of
rule 165a requires the trial court to dismiss for want of prosecution any mat-
ter the court sets for dismissal unless the plaintiff shows good cause for
maintaining the case on the docket.347 If the trial court keeps the case on
the docket, the rule obligates the court to enter a pretrial order that assigns
the case a trial date and sets deadlines for various pretrial matters. 348 After
the court enters the pretrial order it may only grant a continuance if the
court specifically determines, by court order, that the reasons are valid and
compelling.349
Amended rule 567, 350 which covers motions for new trial in the justice
courts, requires the parties to support by affidavit any new trial motion, un-
less the grounds for new trial are that the verdict or the judgment is contrary
to the law or the evidence or that the justice erred in some matter of law. 351
Rule 749352 prohibits all motions for new trial in forcible entry and detainer
cases in the justice courts. 3 53 In Garza v. Gonzales,354 a forcible entry and
detainer case, the county court judge originally signed a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and then granted a new trial. One hundred days after the judge
signed the original judgment the county court judge changed his ruling con-
cerning the new trial and reinstated the original judgment. The court of
appeals, without mentioning rule 749, relied on the provision in rule 329b 315
that limits the trial court's power to act seventy-five days after the court
signs the judgment 356 and held that the trial court, in this case, did not have
authority to vacate its order granting a new trial.357
Finally, in Luna v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 358 a personal in-
jury suit, one of the defendants complained on appeal that the trial court had





347. Id. 165a(2). The time standards are currently eighteen months for a civil jury case or








355. 737 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
356. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b.
357. Id. 329b(c).
358. 737 S.W.2d at 588.
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that the defendant waived this point of error by failing to incorporate the
apportionment complaint in its motion for new trial.359
XV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The most significant development in appellate procedure during the Sur-
vey period was the enactment of numerous amendments to the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1988.
Suspension of Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal in Civil Cases.
Rules 47 and 49 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure36° govern the
procedure for suspending enforcement of judgments through the filing of a
supersedeas bond or other permitted security. 361 The recent amendments to
these rules effected substantial changes in their terminology. For example,
the amendments replaced the terms "appellant" and "appellee" with "judg-
ment debtor" and "judgment creditor," respectively. 362 Likewise, the
amended rules refer to "bonds" or "deposits" for the most part as "secur-
ity," 363 and the court now "suspends enforcement" of a judgment rather
than the old terminology of "superseding" or "suspending execution" on
that judgment.364
More importantly, the upheaval surrounding Texaco's efforts to supersede
the record judgment against it caused the rulesmakers to amend rule 47 so
that the rule no longer automatically requires the appellate to post the bond
for a money judgment in at least the amount of the judgment, interest and
costs. 365 The trial court can now order a reduced bond, after notice to the
parties and a hearing, if the court finds that posting a bond in the amount
formerly required would irreparably harm the judgment debtor and a re-
duced amount would not substantially harm the judgment creditor. 366 The
new rule permits the trial court to stay enforcement of a money judgment
based on any order that adequately protects the judgment creditor from any
loss or damage caused by the appeal. 36 7 In light of this change granting the
trial court discretionary authority to fix the amount of security, the rules-
makers inserted a new provision into rule 47 that provides the trial court
with continuing jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of security in the
event of a change in circumstances. 368
359. 724 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1987).
360. Id. at 384.
361. TEX. R. Civ. P. 47, 49.
362. See id. 47(a), (c)-(f), (h), (i), 49(c).
363. See id. 47(d)-(h), (j), 49(c).
364. See id. 47(a), (d)-(f), 49(b), (c); see also id. 43(b) (language amended to conform to
amended rules 47 and 49).
365. Rule 47(b), prior to its recent amendment, provided that the bond or deposit required
to supersede a money judgment must at least equal the amount of the judgment, interest, and
costs. Tex. R. App. P. 47(b) (West 1987).
366. TEX. R. Civ. P. 47(b).
367. Id. The rulesmakers made similar amendments allowing the court to suspend en-
forcement of money judgments with or without bond, to sections (d) and (e) of rule 47, which
concern judgments of foreclosure on real estate and personal property. Id. 47(d), (e).
368. Id. 47(k). If the trial court makes any order regarding the security or sureties after the
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The court of appeals may review any order entered by the trial court pur-
suant to amended rule 47.369 The rule requires the court of appeals to hear a
motion for review at the earliest practical time but it allows the court to
remand the matter to the trial court for findings of fact or for the taking of
evidence. 370 Since the amendments to rules 47 and 49 contemplate that the
trial court will base the amount of security on the circumstances of the par-
ties, the rulesmakers also amended the post-judgment discovery rule to per-
mit discovery of information relevant to the security issue. 371
Briefs. Apart from a semantic change made to rule 74372 and the elimina-
tion of an existing ambiguity in rule 136,373 the only amendment to the rules
concerning appellate briefs imposes a page limitation on all briefs filed in the
courts of appeal or the Supreme Court of Texas. Under the new rules appel-
late briefs in civil cases cannot exceed fifty pages, excluding the table of con-
tents, index of authorities, points of error, and any addenda, unless the court
permits a longer brief upon motion of the party.374 Applications for writ of
error to the supreme court, briefs in response to an application, and amicus
briefs filed with the court also may not exceed fifty pages without an order of
the supreme court.375
Disqualification of Judges. Rule 15a 376 is a new rule that states the grounds
for recusal or disqualification of an appellate judge or justice. The rule is
identical to the companion rule governing disqualification of trial judges377
and provides that appellate judges shall disqualify themselves in all proceed-
ings in which they, or another lawyer with whom they previously practiced
served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, they know that they have an
interest in the subject matter in controversy, either individually or as a fidu-
ciary, or they are related to either of the parties by affinity or consanguinity
within the third degree.378 The rule also provides that appellate judges
appellate court's jurisdiction has attached, the judgment debtor is required to notify the court
of appeals of the trial court's determination. Id.
369. Id. 49(b).
370. Id.
371. TEX. R. Civ. P. 621a now provides:
Also, at any time after rendition of judgment, either party may, for the purposes
of obtaining information relevant to motions allowed by Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure 47 and 49 initiate and maintain in the trial court in the same suit
in which said judgment was rendered any discovery proceeding authorized by
these rules for pre-trial matters.
372. TEX. R. Civ. P. 74(f) now provides that the brief of the argument "may," rather than
"shall," present separately or grouped the points relied upon for reversal.
373. Id. 136(a) now makes it clear that the fifteen-day period for responding to an applica-
tion for writ of error to the supreme court commences upon the filing of the application in the
supreme court. Although this was the existing practice even before enactment of the amend-
ment, the rule was ambiguous since the applying party files the applications initially with the
court of appeals.
374. Id. 74(h). The rule operates only in the absence of local rules for individual courts of
appeal that specify some contrary rule. Id.
375. Id. 131(i), 136(e).
376. Id. 15a.
377. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a, discussed supra notes 251-70 and accompanying text.
378. TEX. R. Civ. P. 15a(l).
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should recuse themselves in any proceeding in which someone might ques-
tion their impartiality because of, among other things, personal bias or preju-
dice concerning the subject matter or a party in the proceeding. 379
The Record on Appeal. Prior to its amendment, rule 54380 required the ap-
pellant in any case in which either party made a timely motion for new trial
or modification of the judgment to file the transcript and the statement of
facts in the appellate court within one hundred days after the trial judge
signed the judgment.38 1 Since either party could perfect its appeal up to
ninety days after the trial judge signed the judgment under those circum-
stances, the rule proved unwieldy. The rulesmakers accordingly amended
the rule to extend the period for filing the appellate record to 120 days after
the date the trial judge signs the judgment.382 The rule continues to require
the appellant to file the record within sixty days of judgment when neither
party files a timely motion for new trial or modification of the judgment. 383
As the result of an amendment of no apparent consequence, rule 54(a) now
also provides that the appellate court has the authority to consider all timely
filed transcripts and statements of fact.3 84
Supreme Court Jurisdiction and Procedure. On June 20, 1987, several wide-
ranging amendments to section 22.001 of the Texas Government Code, 385
which sets forth the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Texas, became
effective.38 6 The legislature also expanded the jurisdiction of the supreme
court to now allow writs of error in cases involving divorce, child custody, or
support.387 In those civil cases in which the statutes neither prohibit writs of
error by the supreme court,388 nor oblige the court to assume jurisdiction, 38 9
the court now has jurisdiction when it appears that the court of appeals has
committed an error of law that is so important to state jurisprudence that it
requires correction. 390 The supreme court no longer automatically assumes
jurisdiction over cases in which the court of appeals commits reversible er-
ror. Instead, the court must first determine whether the error is significant
379. Id. 15a(2).
380. Id. Tex. R. App. P. 54(a) (Vernon Special Pam. 1987).
381. Id. 54(a).
382. TEX. R. Civ. P. 54(a).
383. Id.
384. Id. The rule continues to provide, as it did before, that the court has no authority to
consider any portion of the record that is filed late. Id.
385. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.001 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1988).
386. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 1106, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7649 (Vernon).
387. Id. § 2, at 7650 (deleting former subsection (b)(3) of TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 22.225.
388. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b)(1)-(6) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1988) (listing
cases, such as those involving slander or temporary injunction, in which the judgment of the
court of appeals is conclusive as to the law and facts).
389. Id. § 22.001(a)(l)-(5) provides for appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court of cases
in which a justice dissented in the court of appeals, cases in which the decision conflicts with
another appellate decision regarding a material issue of law, cases involving the construction
or the validity of a statute necessary to determine the case, and cases involving state revenue or
in which the railroad commission is a party.
390. Id. § 22.001(a)(6).
[Vol. 42
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
to the overall fabric of Texas law. The rulesmakers amended rule 133 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to reflect the jurisdictional amendment,
deleting the writ notation "refused, no reversible error. '3 91 In its place the
rulesmakers substituted the new notation "writ denied," which denotes that
the court was not satisfied that the court of appeals correctly declared the
law in all respects but found no error of law that required reversal or was of
sufficient importance to the development of Texas law as to warrant consid-
eration by the court.392
The rulesmakers slightly changed procedures involving original proceed-
ings for writs of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction during the survey
period. Although rule 121 continues to require the petitioner to file three
copies of his motion, petition, and brief with the clerk when he initiates the
proceeding in the court of appeals, the amended rule clarifies that the peti-
tioner must file twelve copies if he files with the supreme court.393 In addi-
tion, the petitioner's original filing must now include a certified or sworn
copy of the order complained of and other relevant exhibits. 394 For those
who may have overlooked rule 13,395 amended rule 121 also reminds the
petitioner to include a deposit for costs with his filing.396
Finally, the rulesmakers amended rule 122, adding. habeas corpus to the
causes that the supreme court may rule upon without hearing oral
argument. 397
Miscellaneous. Rule 52 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure previ-
ously required no offer of proof to preserve error when the trial court ex-
cluded evidence if no party requested an offer and the context of the
questions asked revealed the substance of the excluded evidence. 398 The
amended rule, however, requires an offer of proof in all cases before a party
can predicate error upon the trial court's exclusion of evidence. 399
The scope of rule 84, which permits an appellate court to assess damages
against an appellant who prosecutes an appeal either without sufficient cause
or for delay, is now limited to courts of appealA° ° The rulesmakers, how-
ever, did not intend by this amendment to deprive the supreme court of its
391. Prior to its amendment, Tex. R. App. P. 133(a) (West 1987) afforded the supreme
court three options in noting its denial of an application for writ of error: "Refused," "Re-
fused No Reversible Error," and "Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction."
392. TEX. R. Civ. P. 133(a). The rulesmakers also rewrote rule 140, which governs direct
appeals to the supreme court. The amendments to that rule, however, appear wholly semantic








398. Tex. R. App. P. 52(b) (West 1987).
399. TEX. R. Civ. P. 52(b). The rulesmakers also amended evidence rule 103, which con-
cerns offers of proof, to conform to this new requirement set forth in amended rule 52. See
TEX. R. EvID. 103(a)(2).
400. TEX. R. Civ. P. 84.
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authority to assess damages for delay. The rulesmakers inserted a new pro-
vision, identical to rule 84 but applying to the supreme court, into rule 182
to preserve this authority. 4° 1
Rule 85, 402 involving remittiturs in civil cases, also has a new provision.
The second section of the amended rule now allows a remitting party to
contest the remittitur on appeal by cross-point, unless that party is the appel-
lant.4°3 Another amendment to the rule appears to have changed the appel-
late standard of review of a trial court's refusal to suggest a remittitur. Rule
85 formerly authorized the court of appeals to suggest a remittitur only if it
found that the trial court had abused its discretion.404 The amended rule,
however, gives that authority to the appellate court whenever it finds that
the trial court simply erred.4° 5
The rulesmakers also amended rule 90(a), 406 which concerns decisions
and opinions of the courts of appeals, during the survey period but the effect
of that amendment is unclear. Before its amendment, the rule required the
court to "decide every substantial issue raised and necessary to disposition of
the appeal.' 4°7 The amended rule, on the other hand, only requires the
court's opinion to "address every issue raised and necessary to final disposi-
tion of the appeal."408 Although these differences between the two versions
of the rule appear slight, judicial clarification of the amendment may be nec-
essary before practitioners can safely assume that the amendment effected no
substantive change in the courts' widespread practice of ignoring those
points that they determine are unnecessary to the decision, even though the
parties properly raise the points on appeal.
Two cases decided during the Survey period serve as a warning to appel-
lees who choose to rely on cross-points as the means of preserving their com-
plaints about the judgment rendered by the trial court. In Chapman Air
Conditioning, Inc. v. Franks4° 9 one of the appellees, by cross-points, attacked
the trial court's failure to award him attorney's fees in the judgment. In its
opinion the court of appeals acknowledged that an appellee may use cross-
points to bring forward complaints about the actions of the trial court, but
the cross-points must defend the judgment against the appellant.410 Other-
wise, the cross-points cast the appellee in the role of an appellant seeking
reversal or some modification in the judgment.411 Since the appellee in
Franks prayed for reversal of the judgment, at least insofar as it failed to
award him the attorney's fees he claimed, and he failed to comply with the




404. Tex. R. App. P. 85(c) (West 1987).
405. TEX. R. Cv. P. 85(c).
406. Id. 90(a).
407. Tex. R. App. P. 90(a) (West 1987).
408. TEX. R. Civ. P. 90(a).
409. 732 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).




attempted appeal. 4 12 For similar reasons, the court in City of Dallas v.
Moreau4 13 overruled an appellee's cross-points that complained about the
trial court's granting of a summary judgment in favor of two persons who
were not parties to the appeal. According to the court, an appellee who has
not perfected a separate appeal can only present cross-points regarding mat-
ters affecting the interest of the appellant. 4 14
XVI. RES JUDICATA
For almost a hundred years, since the supreme court's decision in Texas
Trunk Ry. v. Jackson Bros.,4 15 Texas has steadfastly adhered to the rule that
a judgment is not final for preclusion purposes while an appeal is pending.
During the years following the Texas Trunk decision most jurisdictions
adopted the contrary federal rule.4 16 Likewise, the Restatement of Judg-
ments adopted the prevailing federal interpretation of finality for res judicata
purposes in the event of an appeal.417 At long last, the decision in Scurlock
Oil Co. v. Smithwick 418 changed Texas law to embrace this majority view.
Overruling Texas Trunk and its progeny, the supreme court declared in
Scurlock that a judgment is final for the purposes of issue and claim preclu-
sion despite the taking of an appeal, unless the appeal amounts to a trial de
novo.4 19 Addressing another thorny res judicata issue, the court acknowl-
edged that Mary Carter agreements are so unfair that they may preclude the
application of collateral estoppel in later lawsuits.420 The court, however,
elected to leave that decision, at least initially, to the discretion of the trial
courts. 4 2 1 The supreme court warned trial judges to be mindful of the fair-
ness factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in the Parklane Hosiery deci-
sion when exercising their discretion in these situations. 422
In Byrom v. Pendley42 3 the Supreme Court of Texas refused to apply res
judicata or collateral estoppel to bar a plaintiff's recovery of oil drilling pro-
duction costs from his co-tenant. The defendant, who had previously pre-
vailed in a separate title suit he brought against the plaintiff relating to the
oil lease, claimed that res judicata barred the second suit since the plaintiff
412. Id. at 742-43.
413. 718 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
414. Id. at 782.
415. 85 Tex. 605, 22 S.W. 1030 (1893).
416. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4433, at 313 (1981) (observing that most courts follow the rule established by federal deci-
sions). The established rule in federal court is that a final judgment retains all of its res judi-
cata consequences pending decision on appeal, except in the unusual situation in which the
appeal actually involves a full trial de novo. Prager v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 417 F.2d 1111,
1112 (5th Cir. 1969).
417. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13, comment (f) (1982).
418. 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986).
419. Id. at 6.
420. Id. at 7.
421. Id.
422. Id.; see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (outlining factors
determining whether application of collateral estoppel doctrine in particular situation is fair).
423. 717 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1986).
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could have sought recovery of the production costs in the prior litigation.
The defendant further claimed that the first suit collaterally estopped the
plaintiff from relitigating the issue of the plaintiff's good faith, which the
trial court decided in the first suit. According to the supreme court, the
production cost issues were unrelated to those tried in the title suit and did
not even accrue until after the judgment in the first suit established that the
defendant owned an interest in the mineral lease. 424 The court observed that
the court in the first suit decided that the plaintiff was not a bona fide pur-
chaser of the lease because he had been aware of the defendant's claim. 425
That issue, however, which was relevant to the title question, was different
than the issue of the plaintiff's good faith in conducting drilling operations,
which the defendant presented in the second suit.426 Accordingly, the court
applied neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata to bar the second suit.4 27
XVII. MISCELLANEOUS
New rule 264 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure428 permits the parties
to agree to present at trial all testimony and other appropriate evidence by
videotape. 429 The expenses of the videotape recordings are taxable as costs
and if either party withdraws agreement, the court will charge that party the
costs that have accrued up to that point. 430 This new procedure is appar-
ently discretionary with the trial court, however, letting the court ignore the
parties' agreement. 4 31
An amendment to rule 267432 eliminated the trial court's discretion in
placing witnesses under the rule. If any party now invokes the rule, exclu-
sion of the affected witnesses from the courtroom is mandatory. 43 3 The
rulesmakers also slightly modified the description of the persons subject to
rule 267. If a party is a natural person, his or her spouse is likewise now
exempt from the rule's effect. 434 The amended rule also appears to limit the
persons a corporation or partnership can designate as its trial representatives
to officers and employees.4 35 Finally, the rule permits the parties to exempt
from the ambit of the rule any other person whose presence is essential to the
presentation of their case.436
For the weary practitioners struggling to complete their preparations for a
temporary injunction hearing in only ten days, the rulesmakers granted




428. TEX. R. Civ. P. 264.
429. Id.
430. Id. Unfortunately, the rule is silent on the question of how late in the trial a party can









some relief, albeit limited. Amended rule 680 now authorizes trial courts to
enter temporary restraining orders up to fourteen days in length. 437
437. Id. 680.
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